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WE ARE SUBJECTING WHOLE POPULATIONS TO EXPO-
SURE TO CHEMICALS WHICH ANIMAL EXPERIMENTS
HAVE PROVED TO BE EXTREMELY POISONOUS AND ARE,
IN MANY CASES, CUMULATIVE IN THEIR EFFECTS.
THESE EXPOSURES NOW BEGIN AT OR BEFORE BIRTH
AND-UNLESS WE CHANGE OUR METHODS-WILL CON-
TINUE THROUGH THE LIFETIME OF THOSE NOW LIV-
ING. NO ONE KNOWS WHAT THE RESULTS WILL BE
BECAUSE WE HAVE NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE TO
GUIDE US.1
I. Introduction
In 1996, Congress passed the Food Quality Protection Act of
1996 (FQPA)2 and amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA). 3 Both Acts require the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), in consultation with the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services, to develop a screening
program for endocrine disrupting effects. 4 The requirements of
this screening program and its potential impact on products liabil-
ity claims will be examined in this Comment.
In 1996, Theo Colborn, Dianne Dumanoski and John Peterson
Myers published the book, Our Stolen Future: Are We Threatening
Our Fertility, Intelligence, and Survival?-A Scientific Detective
Story.5 Their book began a debate over endocrine disruptors and
the regulation of synthetic chemicals and pesticides. These au-
thors argue that synthetic chemicals that have the characteristics
of being persistent, toxic and bioaccumulative, are adversely af-
fecting humans and wildlife by disrupting normal endocrine path-
1. Vice-President Al Gore, Foreword to THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN Fu-
TURE, ARE WE THREATENING OUR FERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL? - A SCIEN-
TIFIC DETECTIVE STORY, v-vi (Penguin Group 1996) (quoting Rachel Carson).
2. See The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170 (1996) (codi-
fied at 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1996)).
3. See Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182 110
Stat. 1613 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C § 300f-j (1996)).
4. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(4)(f)(1)(C)(v) (1996); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-17 (1996).
5. THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FER-
TILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SURvrvAL?-A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (Penguin
Group 1996).
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ways.6 They also argue that synthetic chemicals should be
assumed guilty until proven innocent. 7 The authors call for basic
revisions in the U.S. laws that govern environmental health stan-
dards to ensure protection from chemicals that interfere with hor-
mones.8 They also call for international agreement for the world-
wide phase out of the production and use of persistent hormone-
disrupting chemicals, and urge that new financial support be pro-
vided for the containment, retrieval, and clean-up of such chemi-
cals. 9  While acknowledging that "many unknowns and
uncertainties" remain in the scientific understanding of the threat
these chemicals pose to humans, they assert the evidence exists
and warrants immediate action. 10
Not surprisingly, the chemical industry, through trade as-
sociations such as the Chlorine Chemistry Council (CCC), Chemi-
cal Manufacturers Association (CMA) and the Specialty Organic
Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA), has refuted the
theory, citing flaws in the scientific studies cited by these au-
thors. 1 Nonetheless, EPA, in 1996, as a result of the passage of
the endocrine testing requirements in the SDWA and FQPA, es-
tablished the Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advi-
sory Committee (EDSTAC).12 EDSTAC was formed to recommend
a testing program that will allow EPA to meet its congressional
mandate of having testing in place by the year 2000.13
Many of the chemicals implicated by scientists supporting the
endocrine disrupting theory are contained in products that con-
sumers are in contact with every day-either directly or through
food and water sources. 14 The health effects these chemicals are
6. See id. at 122-41.
7. See id. at 219.
8. See id. at 220-22.
9. See id. at 225-26.
10. Colborn et al., supra note 5, at 212.
11. See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council, Our Stolen Future - Question and An-
swers (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://c3.org/aol/ibrary/stolenqu396.html>.
12. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE CHARTER, ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR SCREENING AND TESTING COMMITTEE (Office of
Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances, Nov. 20, 1996) [hereinafter ESTAC
CHARTER] (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/oscpmont/ospendo/history/
endo4_l.htm>.
13. See id.
14. See A. Krishnan et al., Bisphenol-A: An Estrogenic Substance Is Released from
Polycarbonate Flasks During Autoclaving, 132(8) ENDOCRINOLOGY 2279-86 (1993); see
also S. Jobling et al., A Variety of Environmentally Persistent Chemicals, Including
some Phthalate Plasticizers, Are Weakly Estrogenic, 103(6) ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPEC-
TIVES 582-87 (1995); C. Purdom et al., Estrogenic Effects of Effluents from Sewage
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alleged to have range from attention deficit disorder in children, 15
to breast cancer in women. 16 The legal ramifications, in terms of
potential products liability and other claims, can be significant as
these chemicals are found in almost all consumer goods.
Our Stolen Future has raised some important potential legal
and policy issues, including whether current health standards are
adequate and whether the current science will support potential
claims by consumers for adverse health effects suffered due to al-
leged exposure to chemicals implicated as causing effects on the
endocrine system. The goal of this Comment is to examine the
current state of the science and comment as to whether U.S. policy
is directed toward adequately addressing the health issues in a
timely manner. The paper also examines whether the current sci-
ence supports a successful products liability claim and comments
as to why this may or may not be possible.
II. Background
A. Our Stolen Future
In order to understand the current EPA and FDA (Food and
Drug Administration) philosophy concerning the safety testing of
chemicals intentionally added to pesticides, foods, products con-
tacting food, and consumer products, it is necessary to examine
the claims made in Our Stolen Future. This book has been com-
pared by some to Rachel Carson's Silent Spring 7 and has resulted
in a major research initiative by EPA, in cooperation with the
FDA.18 Our Stolen Future is the foundation for much of this re-
search.' 9 Therefore, it is important to understand the scientific
hypotheses contained in the book in order to grasp the potential
legal issues arising from these authors' allegations.
Our Stolen Future focuses on a growing body of scientific re-
search implicating synthetic industrial chemicals and pesticides
in interfering with the normal function of the endocrine system in
Treatment Works, 8 CHEMISTRY AND ECOLOGY 275-85 (1994); S. Jobling and J. Sump-
ter, Detergent Components in Sewage Effluent Are Weakly Oestrogenic to Fish: An In
Vitro Study Using Rainbow Trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) Hepatocytes, 27 AQUATIC
TOXICOLOGY 361-72 (1993).
15. See Colborn et al., supra note 5, at 122-41.
16. See Colborn et al., supra note 5, at 122-41.
17. See Colborn et al., supra note 5, at 167.
18. See EPA Advisory Committee, EDSTAC FINAL REPORT, ES-1 (Aug. 1998)
[hereinafter EDSTAC FINAL REPORT] (visited Jan.20, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/scu-
poly/ospendo/history/finalrpt.htm>.
19. See id.
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humans and wildlife. 20 Such disruption causes a variety of
problems with development, behavior and reproduction. 21 The
fundamental question raised by the endocrine issue is whether ex-
posure to small amounts of synthetic chemicals in food, water or
air can interfere with the hormonal systems of humans and wild-
life to cause adverse health effects. 22 The legal question is
whether the intentional addition of these synthetic chemicals to
pesticides, foods, food containers and consumer products can give
rise to products liability actions by those individuals exposed to
these chemicals who are suffering from the adverse health effects
claimed.
Endocrine modulation is not new to science. 23 Our Stolen Fu-
ture raises important issues with regard to the use of science in
the regulation and policy issues concerning the effects of man-
made chemicals on human health and the environment. 24 The au-
thors call for basic revisions in domestic laws governing environ-
mental health standards to ensure protection from chemicals that
interfere with hormones. 25 Specifically, they urge that these new
health standards include: 1) shifting the burden of proof to chemi-
cal manufacturers to show that a chemical is safe before a new
chemical is used; 2) an emphasis on preventing exposure; 3) set-
ting standards that protect the most vulnerable, namely children
and the unborn; 4) considering the interactions among chemicals,
not just the effects of each chemical individually; 5) considering
the cumulative exposure from air, food, water and other sources;
6) having a "right to know" provision for products; 7) requiring
companies that sell products to monitor their products for endo-
crine disrupting chemicals; 8) broadening the Toxic Release In-
ventory (TRI) to include endocrine disrupting chemicals; and 9)
reforming health data systems to enable them to provide informa-
tion needed to make sound and protective policies. 26 With these
provisions in place, consumers could make informed decisions as
to what types and amounts of exposure they are willing to accept.
20. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5; see also Robert J. Kavlock et al., Research
Needs for the Risk Assessment of Health and Environmental Effects of Endocrine Dis-
ruptors: A Report of the U.S. EPA-Sponsored Workshop, 104 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPEC-
TWES (Supplement 4) (Aug. 1996).
21. See Colborn et al., supra note 5, at 121.
22. See Colborn et al., supra note 5, at 121.
23. See Colborn et al., supra note 5, at 121.
24. See Colborn et al., supra note 5, at 218-22.
25. See Colborn et al., supra note 5, at 218-22.
26. See Colborn et al., supra note 5, at 218-22.
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B. The Endocrine System
The endocrine system is a complex biological system defined
as any glandular tissues or cells that release hormones or chemi-
cal messengers to cause an effect on a target tissue or cell to pro-
duce a response. 27 If the well-being of the endocrine system is
compromised it can lead to adverse effects on the metabolic sys-
tem, produce developmental abnormalities or reproductive dys-
function. 28 It should be noted that a chemical action on the
endocrine system may not be an undesirable effect; chemical or
drug suppression of target organ hormones has been used and can
be therapeutically useful.29
The fundamental concept of the endocrine system is that en-
docrine cells release a hormone that is then transported to a re-
ceptor site at a target tissue.30 Almost all tissues in the human
body are "target organs" for one or more hormones.31 The hor-
mone then binds to the receptor and exerts a biological effect. 32
Hormones can also act locally.33 This effect, known as a
"paracrine effect," occurs when a cell, known as an effector cell,
releases a hormone on an adjacent target cell to produce a local
effect.34 An example of this is through the action of growth hor-
mones.35 Another pathway for hormonal action is known as the
"autocrine system."36 The autocrine system activates when a par-
ticular cell releases a hormone that then acts on the same cell to
augment a particular response. 37 Examples of these types of cells
are found in the nervous, gastrointestinal and immune systems.38
Hormones have been categorized into four different chemical
categories. 39 These include proteins (e.g. insulin, growth hor-
mones), polypeptides (e.g., thyrotropin-releasing hormones),
27. See JOEL G. HARDMAN ET AL. EDS., GOODMAN & GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOGI-
CAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 1363 (McGraw-Hill, 9 th ed. 1996).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1291-1308.
30. See id. at 30-37.
31. See id.
32. See JOEL G. HARDMAN ET AL. EDS., GOODMAN & GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOGI-
CAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 579 (McGraw-Hill, 9 th ed. 1996).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See JOEL G. HARDMAN ET AL. EDS., GOODMAN & GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOGI-
CAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 579 (McGraw-Hill, 9 th ed. 1996).
38. See id. at 1363.
39. See id. at 29-37.
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amines (e.g., epinephrine) and steroids (e.g., estrogens, andro-
gens).40 In addition, chemicals that do not fall into these catego-
ries have been shown to act on hormone receptors, 41 making it
difficult to predict the potential action of chemicals based on struc-
ture alone. 42
C. Biological Effects Due to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals
1. Cancer-Causing Effects
Examination of cases in which pregnant women were exposed
to diethylstilbestrol (DES) supplies support for one hypothesis im-
plicating a causal association between endocrine disruptors and
cancer in humans.43 DES exposure of pregnant women has been
shown to cause clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and cervix
in their female children.44 This finding led to a number of impor-
tant conclusions. 45 First, maternal exposures during pregnancy
can lead to cancer in offspring.46 Also, it demonstrates that a syn-
thetic estrogen can cause cancer. 47 Additionally, some of the male
children of women who took DES during pregnancy were found to
display pseudohermaphroditism 48 and malformations of the geni-
talia, including testicular abnormalities such as small testes, re-
duced semen quality and epidymal cysts. 49 These findings are
offset by follow-up surveys of DES-exposed male children who did
not show impaired fertility or sexual function, 50 or evidence of an
increased risk of testicular cancer. 51
40. See id. at 1363.
41. See id. at 29-37.
42. See HARDMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 29-37.
43. See A. Herbst et al., Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina. Association of Maternal
Diethylstilbestrol Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284 NEW ENG. J.
MED., 878-81 (1971).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See N.M. Kaplan, Male Pseudohemaphrodism; Report of a Case with Observa-
tions on Pathogenesis, 261 NEW ENG. J. MED. 641-44 (1959).
49. See W.H. Gil et al., Association of Diethylstilbestrol Exposure in utero with
Cryptochidism, Testicular Hypoplasia and Semen Abnormalities, 122 J. UROLOGY 36-
39 (1979); see also S.G. Driscoll, S.H. Taylor, Effects of Prenatal Estrogen on the Male
Urogenital System, 56 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 537-42 (1980); R. Penny, The Ef-
fects of DES on Male Offspring, 136 WESTERN J. MED. 329-30 (1982).
50. See F.J. Leary et al., Males Exposed in utero to Diethylstilbestrol, 252 JAMA
2984-89 (1984); A.J. Wilcox et al., Fertility in Men Exposed Prenatally to Diethylstil-
bestrol, 332 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1411-15 (1995).
51. See id. at 2984.
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In the United States, the most common type of cancer is
breast cancer. 52 Several risk factors associated with an increased
risk of breast cancer related to hormonal activity include age,
race, decreased parity, age at first delivery and age at the onset of
menstruation. 53 Breast tumors can also be characterized by their
degree of positive estrogen-receptor activity.54 Consequently,
"[t]he evidence supports a causal relationship between female
breast cancer and hormonal activity."55
Studies have shown that a number of organochlorine pesti-
cides or metabolites of pesticides are found in human breast milk
and fat tissue.56 Several recent studies suggest a possible rela-
tionship between an increased breast cancer risk and the level of
organohalides in human tissues, but a clear relationship across
the studies has not been established.5 7 In general, these studies
suggest that levels of a metabolite of dichlorodiphenyl trichloro-
ethane (DDT), known as dichlorodiphenyl dichloroethane (DDE),
and total polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), were higher in the se-
rum or fat of women who had breast cancer.58 However, the
meaning of these findings is unclear as both DDE and PCB metab-
olites have little estrogenic activity. 59 The data are further con-
founded in that studies of women occupationally exposed to high
levels of PCBs have not demonstrated an excess risk of breast can-
cer mortality.60 Thus, based on the results of these studies, fur-
52. See ROCKFORD REGISTER STAR, Apr. 7, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5624998.
As reported in this 1998 article, one in nine women in North America will develop
breast cancer in her lifetime.
53. See R.J. Kavlock et al., supra note 20, at 4.
54. See R.J. Kavlock et al., supra note 20, at 4.
55. R.J. Kavlock et al., supra note 20, at 4.
56. See A.A. JENSEN, S.A. SLORACH, CHEMICAL CONTAMINANTS IN HUMAN MILK
(CRC Press, 1991); B.R. Sonawane, Chemical Contaminants in Human Milk: An
Overview, ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, 103 (Supplement 6), 197-205 (1995).
57. See M. Unger et al., Organochlorine Compounds in the Adipose Tissue of De-
ceased Persons with and without Cancer: a Statistical Survey of some Potential Con-
founders, 29 ENVTL. RES. 371-76 (1984); see also H. Mussalo-Rauhamaa et al.,
Occurrence of Beta-hexachlorocyclohexane in Breast Cancer Patients, 66 CANCER 2124-
28 (1990); H. Austin et al., A Prospective Follow-up of Cancer Mortality in Relation to
Serum DDT, 79 Am. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 43-46 (1989); F. Falck et al., Pesticides and
Polychlorinated Biphenyl Residues in Human Breast Lipids and Their Relation to
Breast Cancer, 47 ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH 143-46 (1992); M.S. Wolff et al., Blood Levels
of Organochlorine Residues and Risk of Breast Cancer, 85 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 648-
52 (1993); A.K. Henderson et al., Breast Cancer among Women Exposed to
Polybrominated Biphenyls, 6(5) EPIDEMIOLOGY 544-46 (1995).
58. See id.
59. See Kavlock et al. supra note 20, at 4.
60. See D.P. Brown, Mortality of Workers Exposed to Polychlorinated Biphenyl -
An Update, 42 ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH, 333-39 (1987); see also T. Sinks et al., Risk
358 [Vol. 17
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ther research is needed to definitively establish a causal
relationship between endocrine-disrupting chemicals and breast
cancer in women.61
2. Reproductive Effects
The endocrine system is not the only mechanism by which ad-
verse effects on reproduction can occur.62 There are, however, ex-
amples of chemical agents that have been shown to alter
reproductive development by an endocrine mechanism.63 These
chemicals include DES, pesticides including DDT and kepone, and
other chemicals, including dioxins and some PCBs. 64 In humans,
evidence linking endocrine disrupting chemicals to adverse repro-
ductive effects has been shown in the children of DES mothers. 65
Males exposed to kepone have been reported to have reproductive
dysfunction, 66 while in females, lactation has been found to de-
crease with increasing DDE levels in breast milk.67 There has
also been a report of declining sperm quality in males over the last
several decades but the cause is still not known. 68 Several other
chemical or chemical classes, such as alkylphenols, some phtha-
lates and bisphenol A, have been shown to interfere with some
Factors Associated with Excess Mortality among Polychlorinated Biphenyl Exposed
Workers, 136 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 389-98 (1992).
61. See D.P. Brown, Mortality of Workers Exposed to Polychlorinated Biphenyl -
An Update, 42 ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH, 333-39 (1987); see also T. Sinks et al., Risk
Factors Associated with Excess Mortality among Polychlorinated Biphenyl Exposed
Workers, 136 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 389-98 (1992).
62. See PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF TOxICOLOGY, 998 (A. Wallace Hayes ed., 3d
1994).
63. See P.S. Guzelian, Comparative Toxicology of Chlordecone (kepone) in
Humans and Experimental Animals, 22 ANN. REV. PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 89-
113 (1982); see also W.J. Rogan et al., Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) and
Dichlorodiphenyl Dichlorethane (DDE) in Human Milk: Effects on Growth, Morbidity
and Duration of Lactation, 77 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1294-97 (1987); B.C. Gladen,
W.J. Rogan, DDE and Shortened Duration of Lactation in a Northern Mexican Town,
85 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 504-08 (1995).
64. See generally supra note 63.
65. See supra notes 49 and 50.
66. See Guzelian, supra note 63.
67. See W.J. Rogan et al., Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) and Dichlorodiphenyl
Dichlorethane (DDE) in Human Milk: Effects on Growth, Morbidity and Duration of
Lactation, 77 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1294-97 (1987); B.C. Gladen, W.J. Rogan, DDE
and Shortened Duration of Lactation in a Northern Mexican Town, 85 AM. J. PUBLIC
HEALTH 504-08 (1995).
68. See E. Carlsen et al., Evidence for Decreasing Sperm Quality of Semen during
the past 50 Years, 304 BRITISH MED. J. 609-13 (1992); J. Auger et al., Decline in Semen
Quality among Fertile Men in Paris during the past 20 Years, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED.
281-85 (1995).
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endocrine-mediated pathways, but there is currently no direct evi-
dence of an effect in humans or other animals. 69
3. Effects on the Nervous System
Chemicals can exert an effect on the nervous system, thereby
affecting the endocrine system through multiple mechanisms. 70
There can be a direct effect on an endocrine gland, such as the
thyroid, to change the hormonal balance to affect the nervous sys-
tem, causing neurotoxicity. 71 Alternatively, endocrine disruptors
can act on the central nervous system to affect the endocrine sys-
tem.72 The end result is an adverse effect on behavior, learning
and memory, attention, sensory function and psychomotor
development.73
4. Effects on the Immune System
Studies have suggested that exposure of humans to DES,
TCDD, PCBs, carbamates, organochlorides, organometals and cer-
tain heavy metals change the immune system to cause immu-
nosuppression. 74 Evidence of an increased rate of autoimmunity
associated with prenatal DES exposure suggests that other endo-
crine disruptors may cause a similar pathological state.75 Evi-
dence indicates that the incidences of allergy and asthma (which
are forms of hypersensitivity) are increasing in humans. 76 It is
not known whether exposures to endocrine disrupting chemicals
are responsible. 77
69. See R.J. Kavlock et al., supra note 20, at 7.
70. See Theo Colborn et al., Developmental Effects of Endocrine-disrupting Chem-
icals in Wildlife and Humans, 101 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 378-84 (1993).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See K.L. Noller et al., Increased Occurrence of Autoimmune Disease among
Women Exposed in utero to Diethylstilbestrol, 49(6) FERTILITY & STERILITY J. 1080-82
(1988); M.I. Luster et al., Immunotoxicology: Review of Current Status, 46 ANNALS OF
ALLERGY 427-32 (1990).
75. See id.
76. See A.S. Buist, W.M. Vollmer, Reflections of the Rise in Asthma Morbidity and
Mortality, 264 JAMA 1719-20 (1990); see also K.B. Weiss, D.K. Wagener, Changing
Patterns of Asthma Mortality. Identifying Target Populations at High Risk, 264
JAMA 1688-92 (1990); P.J. Gergen, K.B., Weiss, Changing Pattern of Asthma Hospi-
talization Among Children: 1979-1987, 264 JAMA 1688-92 (1990).
77. See id.
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III. United States Laws and Research Initiatives
A. Federal Initiatives
In response to the growing concern over environmental endo-
crine disruptors, in August 1996, Congress passed both the
FQPA78 and amendments to the SDWA.79 Both of these laws con-
tain provisions requiring the screening and testing of pesticides
and chemicals for potential endocrine disrupting effects.80 Specifi-
cally, these laws require EPA, in consultation with the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, to "develop a screening program,
using appropriate validated test systems and other scientifically
relevant information, to determine whether certain substances
may have an effect in humans that is similar to an effect produced
by a naturally occurring estrogen and other such endocrine effect
as the Administrator may designate."8 ' These laws also require
EPA to develop a screening program by August 1998 and imple-
ment the program by August 1999.82 A report on the progress of
the program must be presented to Congress by August 2000.83
The two laws target different sets of chemical substances.
Section 304 of the FQPA states that in carrying out the program,
the Administrator shall" (A) provide for the testing of all pesticide
chemicals; and (B) may provide for the testing of any other sub-
stance that may have an effect that is cumulative to an effect of a
pesticide chemical if the Administrator determines that a sub-
stantial population may be exposed to such a substance. '8 4
Section 136 of the SDWA amendments states that "in addition
to the substances referred to in the FQPA, the Administrator may
provide for testing under the screening program authorized by the
FQPA for any other substance that may be found in sources of
drinking water if the Administrator determines that a substantial
population may be exposed to such substance."8 5 It should be
noted that the FQPA and amendments to the SDWA supplement
78. See 21 U.S.C. § 345 (1996).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 136 (1996).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 300j-17 (1996).
81. Id.
82. See 21 U.S.C. § 345 (1996).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 136 (1996).
84. 21 U.S.C. § 304 (1996).
85. Id. § 136.
11
362 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
testing requirements already in place for new and existing pesti-
cides and industrial chemicals.8 6
As a result of the passage of the FQPA and the SDWA, the
EPA formed the Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advi-
sory Committee, or EDSTAC.s 7 The EDSTAC is composed of indi-
viduals representing various stakeholder groups and scientific
experts, including representatives from the EPA, FDA, state agen-
cies, industry, worker protection and labor organizations, national
environmental groups, public health groups, and research scien-
tists.88 The EDSTAC goals were defined to:
1) develop a flexible process to select and prioritize chemicals
and pesticides for screening, recognizing the need to obtain and
utilize appropriate exposure information in setting priorities; 2)
develop a process for identifying new and existing screening
tests and mechanisms for their validation; 3) agree on a set of
available, validated screening tests for early application; and 4)
develop a process for deciding when additional tests, beyond
screening tests, are needed and how any of these additional
tests will be validated.8 9
86. See the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, as amended. In 1958,
the FFDCA regulated the use of pesticides as food-additives and established pesticide
tolerances for food. The Act defines a tolerance as the maximum amount of residue
allowed to remain on an agricultural commodity at the time of harvest; the Clean
Water Act (Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 1972, as amended) regulates toxic
water pollutants; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
(1947) as amended, provides a regulatory framework for the registration and use of
pesticides; the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974) sets enforceable standards for sub-
stances in drinking water; the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) (1976) requires
chemical producers to notify EPA prior to introducing new chemicals into commerce
and gives EPA authority to require testing and information reporting, and control of
new and existing industrial chemicals.
87. See EDSTAC CHARTER, supra note 12, at ES-1-15. The Charter established
the EDSTAC in accordance with the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, 5 U.S.C., App. 2 Section 9. The EDSTAC provides advice and counsel to the EPA
on a strategy to screen and test potential endocrine disruptors in order to reduce or
mitigate risk to human health and the environment. See id.
88. See Environmental Protection Agency, ENDOCRINE DISRUPTORS, KEYSTONE
CONVENING REPORT REGARDING THE FORMATION OF THE ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR
SCREENING AND TESTING ADVISORY COMMITTEE, THE KEYSTONE CENTER (Office of Pre-
vention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances, Oct. 1996) (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http:ll
www.riskworld.com/nreports/1996/endocrin/nr6acool.htm>.
89. Id.
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The EDSTAC final recommendations were published in August
1998.90 A summary of the testing approach recommended by this
committee is presented in Figure One.9 1
FIGURE 1: EDSTAC CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PROVIDING
THE STRUCTURE FOR SCREENING AND TESTING FOR
ENDOCRINE DISRUPTORS
9 2
90. See EDSTAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at ES-1-2. The EDSTAC recom-
mended that EPA's endocrine disruptor screening and testing program (EDSTP)
should "address both human and ecological (wildlife) effects." Id. at ES-2. It also
recommends evaluating "endocrine disrupting properties of both chemical substances
and common mixtures." Id. Recognizing that there are over 87,000 chemicals that
must be prioritized for endocrine disrupting screening, the EDSTAC recommended
that "high throughput pre-screening" (HTPS) be established. Id. at ES-3, 8. Priority
setting would be based on different combinations of information and criteria, includ-
ing exposure and effects information. See id. at ES-9. Testing would involve in vitro
and in vivo screening tests for the various endocrine endpoints. See id. at ES-11-15.
91. See EDSTAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at ES-11-15.
92. See EDSTAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at ES-5.
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B. State Initiatives
In addition to the federal initiatives, various states sought to
implement their own programs. 93 The California Assembly
Health Committee, in 1996, rejected legislation that called for the
state to convene a special task force to determine if further studies
were needed on the relationship between chemicals, breast cancer
and the environmental presence of endocrine disruptors. 94 The
committee granted the bill an opportunity for reconsideration at a
future date. 95
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency forwarded a propo-
sal in June 1996 to the Legislative Commission on Minnesota Re-
sources. 96 The proposal listed nonylphenols and phthalates from
plastics, along with organochloride pesticides, surfactants from
detergents, petrochemicals and residuals from pharmaceuticals as
possible endocrine disruptors. 97 The proposal called for a two-
tiered statewide screening process for endocrine disruptors.98 The
process would involve physical studies and bioassays of fish and
frogs, followed by an analysis of water chemistry at sites where
endocrine anomalies were detected. 99 It also required the analysis
of drinking water intakes and the evaluation of the suitability of
tests for various classes of chemicals for future monitoring. 100 The
proposal also called for a follow up to a study conducted by the
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and the EPA, which
found elevated yoke protein (a female attribute) in male carp on
the Mississippi River near Minnesota. 10 1 Minnesota's governor
approved the project in 1997.102
C. U.S. Industry Group Initiatives
In addition to the EPA and state initiatives, various U.S. in-
dustry groups have established programs to defend the products
their companies manufacture. The CCC, CMA and SOCMA have
93. See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1023 (S.B. 1497) (West). See also 1997 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. 216 (West).
94. See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1023 (S.B. 1497) (West).
95. Id.
96. See 1997 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 216 (West).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See 1997 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 216 (West).
102. See id.
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all established research programs to examine the effect of their
chemicals on the endocrine system.10 3
In 1997, the CMA committed four million dollars towards a
generic endocrine research program.' 0 4 Based on the concept of
"Responsible Care," the CMA outlined the following priorities of
that research:
1. Development of tools that will allow industry to evaluate its
products (this is particularly important to U.S. chemical compa-
nies because of recent mandates laid out by the Food Quality
Protection Act and Safe Drinking Water Act);
2. Set priorities among chemicals for screening and testing
which will be based on a combination of factors including pro-
duction volume, potential exposure, physical and chemical
properties and modeling and structural activity relationships;
3. Ensure that standardized and validated screening tests are
available;
4. Examine risk assessment methods to see if new approaches
are needed for summarizing hazard and exposure information
into a form that is useful for decision-makers;
5. Increase industry's understanding of underlying biological
mechanisms (i.e. what are the thresholds for adverse effects?
What is the shape of the dose-response curve?);
6. Seek further opportunities for collaborations with other in-
terested parties including government agencies, environmental
interest groups and universities to foster scientific consensus
and help resolve some of the risk management and inventory
aspects of the endocrine disruptor issue. 10 5
At that time, CMA also called for the exchange of information
among international groups to avoid duplication of research ef-
forts and to minimize public confusion.10 6 In 1999, CMA an-
nounced that its Board of Directors had approved the first three
years of a research initiative that will be designed to "investigate
103. See Chemical Manufacturers Association, The Chemical Industry's Health
and Environmental Effects Research Initiative (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http:ll
www.cmahq.com/healthresearch.nsf/pages/about>.
104. See International Workshop on Endocrine Disruptors: Workshop Report,
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., 4 (Jan. 23-24, 1997). The CMA is a non-
profit trade association of more than 190 member companies. It represents approxi-
mately 90% of the product capacity for basic industrial chemicals in the U.S.
105. Id. at 4-5.
106. See id. at 5.
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the basic mechanisms by which chemicals interact and react with
human health and the environment."10 7
CCC has published a Question and Answer document specifi-
cally directed at questions raised by Our Stolen Future.108 In
1996, CCC discounted concerns about declining sperm counts and
stated that better cancer detection methods were responsible for
the apparent rise in prostate and breast cancer rates. 10 9 Recently,
CCC has also discounted any health risks due to the presence of
phthalate esters in blood contained in polyvinyl chloride (PVC)
plastic bags." 0
In March 1996, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI), a
non-profit, non-partisan public policy group, downplayed the
human health risks of synthetic chemicals, and pointed to natu-
rally occurring toxins instead."' CEI noted that "naturally-occur-
ring compounds, known as phytoestrogens, are many times more
potent than the synthetic compounds most identified with threats
to endocrine systems, DDT and PCBs, both of which were banned
in the 1970s."112
D. The Response from Environmental Groups
Taking up the call of Theo Colborn, the environmental groups
have focused on persistent organic pollutants, saying that "people
should be considered innocent until proven guilty; chemicals
should not."113 Greenpeace has focused on chemicals such as di-
oxin and PVCs that are used widely in modern consumer products
or are produced as byproducts." 4 Greenpeace has stated "there is
now more than enough scientific evidence to begin a phase out of
toxic hormones such as dioxin and dioxin producing vinyl plas-
107. Chemicals Manufacturers Association, supra note 103. The CMA estimates
that this initial program, totaling $67 million, will grow $25 million per year within
five years. See id.
108. See Chlorine Chemistry Council, supra note 11.
109. See Chlorine Chemistry Council, supra note 11, at 5.
110. See Chlorine Chemistry Council, Key Concerns with Anti-Vinyl Arguments
Made by Health Care Without Harm (visited Feb. 1999) <http://www.c3.org/library/
ivbag-concerns.html//>.
111. See Competitive Enterprise Institute Press Release, Risks to Endocrine Sys-
tems Overstated: New Studies Challenge Latest Environmental Scare Campaign (Mar.
13, 1996) (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.cei.org/press.asp>.
112. Id.
113. M. M. Malkin and M. Fumento, Rachel's Folly: The End of Chlorine, 3 (Chlo-
rine Chemistry Council, pub.1996) (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://c3.org/library/
rachelchlor.html>.
114. See Greenpeace Press Release, Mar. 14, 1996 (visited on Feb. 28, 1999) <http:/
/www.greenpeace.ch/press/1996/133.html//>.
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tics."115 The Sierra Club has called for "immediate action to stop
exposing men, women and children to [chlorine] based chemicals.
Regulation of [dioxin and other chlorinated] chemicals as a class is
the only way that we can adequately address this issue."1 16
IV. Products Liability
A. A Discussion of Products Liability
Before an analysis is presented as to whether the current
state of science would support a successful products liability claim
due to harm from endocrine disrupting chemicals, it is useful to
review the various theories under which such a claim may be
brought. The phrase "products liability" has its roots in case and
statutory law and allows recovery of money damages from the
manufacturers and sellers of defective products that injure people
or property.11 7 There are four principal theories that form the
foundation for products liability suits. 118 These include: 1) negli-
gence; 2) breach of one or more warranties; 3) strict liability, or
liability without fault or negligence; and 4) misrepresentation.1 19
Practically all products liability actions require the plaintiff
to show the product was either: 1) manufactured incorrectly; 2)
was defective in design or formulation; 3) failed to give satisfac-
tory warnings or instructions for safe use; or 4) failed to truthfully
represent the quality of a product. 120 In all cases the plaintiff
must show there was liability on the part of a manufacturer of the
product, causation and damages.1 21
1. Negligence
In negligence actions, the law looks to compensate an individ-
ual for personal injury or property loss that is foreseeable and that
was caused by another person's failure to act with due care under
the circumstances.1 22 From this rule, a seller is liable for negli-
115. Id.
116. J. Robert Cox, Sierra Club President, quoted in THE PLANET (Washington,
D.C.: Sierra Club), Nov. 1994 (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.sierraclub.org
planet/19941 1/alert-dioxin.html>.
117. See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS, § 17.01, at 291 (1996)
[hereinafter DIAMOND ET AL.].
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273 (1988);
see also DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 292.
122. See DIAMOND ET AL., § 3.01, supra note 117, at 45-46.
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gence in a products liability action if he or she acts or fails to act in
a way that creates an unreasonable risk of harm or loss to the user
of a product.123 Liability also attaches to a seller if a person might
be foreseeably injured through the use of the product. 124 To pre-
vail, a plaintiff must prove that there is harm to his or her person
or property, and that there was a proximate cause between the
seller's conduct and the harm suffered. 125
To determine whether a risk is reasonable or unreasonable,
most courts use Judge Learned Hand's risk-benefit model.' 26 This
model weighs the risk and benefits of the product to determine
liability. 127 Thus, the manufacturer has a duty of care that must
be weighed against the potential risk when considering the de-
sign, formulation, fabrication, testing and warnings concerning a
product.' 28 The manufacturer of the product has the burden to
assure that the benefits of the product outweigh the harm that it
may cause. 129
To be successful in a products liability negligence action it is
not necessary to show that the product is "inherently danger-
ous." 130 Rather, the duty of due care requires the manufacturer to
select the appropriate materials and method of manufacture that
will produce a safe product. 31  Where there is more than one
manufacturer of the product, the duty of due care in the final
product may rest on the final expertise of each manufacturer. 132
Additionally, a manufacturer's liability may be limited in cases
where the purchaser of a product has superior knowledge in the
operational or safety requirements of the particular use of the
123. See DIAMOND ET AL., § 3.01, supra note 117, at 292.
124. See DIAMOND ET AL., § 3.01, supra note 117, at 292.
125. See DIAMOND ET AL., § 3.01, supra note 117, at 292.
126. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In Car-
roll Towing Co., Judge Hand stated that an actor's conduct is considered in breach of
his duty when B, the burden of taking measures to avoid the harm, is less than P, the
likelihood or probability that the harm will occur, multiplied by L, the magnitude of
the harm or liability should it occur. See id.
127. See id.
128. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 309.
129. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 309.
130. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 311.
131. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 311.
132. See Elliott v. Century Chevrolet Co., 597 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex. App. 1980).
This case involved a suit against the manufacturer of truck chassises by a worker who
was injured when a beer truck backed up and pinned him between the truck and
loading dock. Since the chassis manufacturer sold trucks to secondary manufacturers
who would then install other units on the chassis the court held that the secondary
manufacturer, not the chassis manufacturer, had the necessary expertise to assess
the safety of its design. See id.
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product. 13 3 Finally, a manufacturer's liability can be limited
when a product leaves its possession and control, is substantially
altered, and is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.134
In addition to the element of due care, reasonably foreseeable
use or misuse also limits a manufacturer's liability. 135 The plain-
tiff must also be a person who might reasonably be foreseen to
use, consume, or be affected by the product. 136 It should be noted
that a manufacturer cannot be held liable for failing to foresee be-
yond what is scientifically or technologically discoverable at the
time of manufacture. 137 Thus, a products liability action may fail
if the plaintiffs harm could not have been anticipated based on
the scientific knowledge that existed when the product was intro-
duced into commerce. Similarly, the majority rule is that the safe
use of a product over time is admissible evidence to show that a
manufacturer met his duty of safe manufacture, but it is not the
only factor that determines when the duty has been met.138
2. Warranties
The concept of warranty in products liability law merges con-
tract with tort.' 39 A warranty provides remedies for persons who
have bought or been exposed to products that either do not satisfy
ordinary expectations, or are dangerous, or both.' 40 Under this
133. See Biss v. Tenneco, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 874 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), appeal de-
nied, 389 N.E.2d 841 (N.Y. 1979). In this case the plaintiffs employer had bought a
loader for its logging operations. The loader rolled over causing the plaintiff injury.
The plaintiffs employer, not the manufacturer of the loader, was held liable for negli-
gence for failing to provide the safety option of a roll-over protection structure. See id.
134. See Robinson v. Reed-Prentiss Div. of Package Machinery Co., 403 N.E,2d 440
(N.Y. 1980).
135. See Wallace v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 389 S.E.2d 155 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
136. See id. This case involved a defective soda bottle that exploded. The explo-
sion did not injure the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff was injured in the clean up. The
court held that plaintiff had the requisite foreseeability of his injury as evidenced by
the finding that the manufacturer intended to hold liquid under pressure and, as a
consequence, should foresee that a bottle can fracture and spill and cause a situation
that will invite the user or others to clean-up the broken glass.
137. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 312.
138. See Fredericks v. American Export Lines, 227 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956). The court's comments are appropriate to the major-
ity view. In affirming a jury verdict that the manufacturer was negligent for a broken
skid that had been used safely for two and a half years the court stated, the "mere
passage of time confers no immunity upon a negligent wrongdoer; but it has relevance
to the likelihood, depending upon the circumstances of a particular case, that deterio-
ration due to use, perhaps accelerated by misuses, will be mistaken by a jury for a
defect due to negligent manufacture or fabrication." Id.
139. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 317.
140. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 317.
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theory, a product can have either an express or an implied war-
ranty.141 An express warranty occurs when the seller makes rep-
resentations to the buyer of quality, performance, construction or
durability of a product. 142 Under the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) section 2-313(1), a seller's assertion of fact can be consid-
ered an express warranty if it "becomes a .benefit of the bar-
gain."'1 43 As a general rule, to be considered part of the basis of
the bargain of the sale, the seller's statement must precede or ac-
company the sale of the product. 44
In addition to an express warranty, the UCC establishes an
implied warranty of merchantability.14 5 Many courts have de-
fined merchantability to mean reasonable fitness for the general
purposes for which the article is sold and used. 146 Thus, to be
merchantable a product need not be perfect or even of high qual-
ity.' 47 It must merely conform to ordinary standards, be of aver-
age grade or quality and have the value of similar goods that are
sold in commerce.' 48
UCC section 2-314(2)(c) also requires that a product be "fit for
[its] ordinary purpose." 49 To be found liable for a breach under a
theory of implied warranty of merchantability it is necessary for a
plaintiff to show that the product failure or accident happened in
an ordinary use of the product. 50 UCC section 2-315 also creates
141. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 317.
142. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 317.
143. U.C.C. § 2-313(1), cmt. 7 (1977).
144. See id.
145. See U.C.C. § 2-314. This section lists six standards to which a product must
conform to be merchantable. To be merchantable, goods must "(a) pass without objec-
tion in the trade under the contract description; and (b) in the case of fungible goods,
are of fair average quality within the description; and (c) are fit for the ordinary pur-
poses for which such goods are used; and (d) run, within the variations permitted by
the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all
units involved; and (e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and (f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any." Additionally, absent exclusion or modification, "other im-
plied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade." Id,
146. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 317.
147. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 317.
148. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 317.
149. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
150. See Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 198 N.E.2d 681, 691 (Ill. App. Ct.
1964). This case involved a child who was injured after she sprayed flammable hair
spray on her hair and dress because of the pleasant fragrance. In holding that it was
for a jury to decide whether this was ordinary use, the court stated "the essential
question presented by a claim of breach of implied warranty of merchantability is
whether the product failed to safely and adequately satisfy the uses to which products
are ordinarily put." Id.
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two conditions for showing that a product is fit for a particular
purpose.15' First, the buyer must rely "on the seller's skill or judg-
ment to select or furnish suitable goods."'1 52 Secondly, at the time
of sale or at the point when the parties enter into a contract to sell,
the seller must have reason to know of the buyer's purpose in buy-
ing the goods and must also have reason to know that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment. 153 Unlike UCC section 2-
314, under section 2-315 the person need only be a seller and not
"a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."1 54
The UCC also allows sellers to disclaim warranties and limit
the remedies available to the buyer.15 5 As a general rule, an ex-
press warranty cannot be disclaimed once it is made, particularly
when the express warranty is made in writing.156 This is in con-
trast to an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose that can be disclaimed. 157 However, in the lat-
ter instance, the seller must follow disclosure and conspicuous-
ness requirements.158 Conspicuous is defined by UCC section 2-
201(10). 159 The issue of conspicuousness is for resolution by the
court. 160 Generally, the main purpose of a warranty under UCC
section 2-316 is to avoid surprise to the buyer and the knowledge
of the disclaimer should be sufficient to give it effect. 161
151. See U.C.C. § 2-315.
152. Id.
153. See id., "Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless ex-
cluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be
fit for such purpose." Id.
154. U.C.C. § 2-314. See also § 2-315.
155. See U.C.C. § 2-316.
156. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
157. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) and (3).
158. See id. Section 2-316(2) states that any language that is intended to modify
the implied warranty of merchantability "must mention merchantability and in case
of writing must be conspicuous." Id. But to be able to exclude or modify any implied
warranty of fitness, the exclusion must be in writing and conspicuous. There are no
particular words that must be used to disclaim the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. Section 2-316(3) gives an example of the type of language that
might be used to exclude all implied warranties of fitness (e.g. "there are no warran-
ties, which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.") Id.
159. See U.C.C.'§ 2-201(10). This section states that the language must be "so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed
it." Id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
21
372 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
"As is" disclaimers are also allowed by the UCC in section 2-
316(2).162 Using words such as "as is," "with all faults," or "as they
stand," for example, the seller may effectively disclaim all
warranties. 163
A seller can also limit the buyer's remedies through use of
warranty limitations, but there are ways for a buyer to overcome
this limitation. 164 A warranty limitation on consequential dam-
ages will not be given effect when they are found to be unconscion-
able. 165 A warranty limitation on consequential damages is
considered prima facie unconscionable in circumstances where a
buyer is seeking consequential damages for injury to a person.166
3. Strict and Fault-Based Liability
In May 1997, the American Law Institute (ALI) adopted the
Restatement (Third) of Torts.167 Like section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts,168 the Third Restatement imposes strict
liability on manufacturers for manufacturing defects. 169 How-
ever, design and warning cases now utilize a fault-based
liability.170
The Restatement (Third) provides a new black letter rule that
imposes a continuing duty to warn on the manufacturer. 171 Fur-
ther, once a product is marketed with adequate warnings, a man-
ufacturer can still incur liability if he does not act as a reasonable
162. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a). "As is" disclaimers can be used as an alternative to
U.C.C. § 2-316(2). This section does not require the seller to follow the guidelines of
section 2-316(2). Instead it requires that the disclaimer be in a "language which in
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty." Id.
163. Id. See also U.C.C. § 2-316(3), cmt. 7.
164. See U.C.C. § 2-719.
165. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
166. See id. See also Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 315 A.2d 16 (N.J. 1974). This case is
a leading decision involving the interpretation of this Code provision. In this case,
five months after buying new tires for his car the plaintiffs decedent was killed in a
car accident as a result of a tire blowout. Uniroyal disclaimed consequential damages
and the warranty limited the seller's liability to repair or replacement of the tire. The
New Jersey Supreme Court noted that where a manufacturer makes express repre-
sentations as to the safety of the product an ordinary buyer would likely buy the prod-
uct relying on the safety assurances and not the repair or replacement remedy noted
in the warranty limitation. Thus, the warranty limitation on damages and liability
were unconscionable.
167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998).
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
169. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1-2 (1998).
170. See id. § 2(b), (c).
171. See id. § 10.
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person with respect to a duty to warn about risks discovered after
the product is on the marketplace. 172
Under the Restatement (Third), a court, in extraordinary cir-
cumstances, may consider imposing liability on a manufacturer
for harms caused by a product that is so dangerous it should never
have been made, even if there is no other way to make the prod-
uct.173 This type of claim is also allowed for pharmaceuticals that
no reasonable practitioner would prescribe. 174
The Restatement (Third) also allows plaintiffs to win liability
claims due to defective design, warnings and mismanufacture
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.175 This doctrine states that
direct evidence is not needed to prove a defect and the plaintiff
need not be an expert. 176 There is almost no case law to support
this view with respect to defects based on either design or
warnings.177
With regard to warnings, the Restatement (Third) also re-
vised the Restatement (Second) approach. Under Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second), a manufacturer could be insulated
from liability by providing a warning. 178 The Restatement (Third)
expressly rejects this approach. Rather, it states that a warning is
one factor that a court should weigh in deciding whether a product
is defective. 179
Two recent decisions have followed the Restatement (Third).
In Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed a $10.3 million judgment for the plaintiff. 8 0 In
agreeing with the trial court judge, the Texas Supreme Court uti-
lized comment f in section two of the Restatement (Third), which
states that a warning is one factor in determining whether a prod-
172. See id. § 10(b).
173. See id. § 2, cmt. e.
174. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c).
175. See id. § 3.
176. See id. § 3.
177. See, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998);
Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand. Co., 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
178. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A, cmt. j. Commentj states, "where warning
is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a
product bearing such a warning which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defec-
tive condition nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Id.
179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. 1. Comment 1 states, "when an alternative
design to avoid risks cannot reasonably be implemented, adequate instructions and
warnings will normally be sufficient to render the product reasonably safe." However,
warnings are not "a substitute for the provision of a reasonably safe design." Id.
180. See Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 331.
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uct is defective. 18' In Uniroyal, the plaintiff admitted seeing a
prominent warning highlighted in yellow and red that told him
not to place a sixteen-inch diameter tire on a 16.5-inch rim. l8 2
The warning was supplemented with a picture of a worker being
thrown into the air with an exploding tire. 8 3 Despite the warn-
ing, the plaintiff proceeded to mount a smaller tire on the larger
rim. 8 4 The tire ultimately exploded causing him severe injury.'8 5
The plaintiff argued that the tire was defective because it did not
incorporate a safer, reasonable, alternative design used by other
tire manufacturers. 8 6 The court agreed with him.'8 7
In another case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit also followed section 2, comment 1 of
the Restatement (Third) in holding that a manufacturer was lia-
ble for injuries a worker incurred in a milling machine accident. 88
As the driver backed up, the milling machine alarm did not sound
to alert the workers in the area, and the driver failed to see the
plaintiff due to a blind spot in the rear view mirror. 8 9 The plain-
tiff's pelvis was crushed in the incident, and internal injuries were
sustained. 190 The manufacturer did provide warnings in both its
operations and maintenance manual, stating that personnel
should stay ten feet from the rear of the machine when it was in
operation; that the operator should confirm that the back-up
alarm was working; and that personnel should examine the area
to assure that it was free of other personnel.' 91 In holding for the
plaintiff, the court found that an adequate warning by itself does
not "immunize a manufacturer from any liability caused by its de-
fectively designed product"192 and that warnings cannot "trump
all other factors."1 93
181. See id. at 335. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f.
182. See Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 332.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 331.
188. See Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
189. See id. at 842.
190. See id. at 842.
191. See id. at 843.
192. Id.
193. Rogers, 144 F.3d at 844.
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4. Toxic Tort Litigation
In looking toward whether exposures to potential endocrine
disrupting chemicals can lead to successful litigation, it is also
useful to examine the litigation involving DES for guidance. 194
DES was a prescription drug prescribed to pregnant women from
the late 1940s through the early 1970s for a variety of reasons. 195
The drug was marketed in the United States by hundreds of phar-
maceutical companies.1 96
In 1971, the FDA determined that DES was both ineffective
and dangerous for use by pregnant women and withdrew approval
for its use.1 97 Studies revealed a link between a form of gynecolog-
ical cancer in daughters born from women who took DES during
pregnancy. 98 By the time FDA approval was withdrawn, the
drug had been used by millions of pregnant women, and many of
their daughters faced the possibility of developing cervical
cancer. 199
As a result of these exposures, thousands of lawsuits were
filed against DES manufacturers20 0 based on products liability
claims. 20 1 In most of these claims the plaintiffs were able to
prove: 1) that DES caused their injuries; 2) the defendant drug
companies manufactured the DES for the prevention of miscar-
riages; 3) the defendants knew or should have known that DES
was carcinogenic; and 4) the defendants failed to warn the plain-
tiffs' mothers of the hazards of the drug.20 2
The plaintiffs also had the burden of identifying which drug
company manufactured the DES their mothers took.20 3 However,
many brands of DES were not patented and fungible DES pills
194. See HARDMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 1420. DES is the common abbreviation
for diethylstilbestrol, a synthetic female hormone with estrogen-like effects.
195. See Note: Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem,
94 HARv. L. REV. 668, 677 (1981) [hereinafter "Note"]. The FDA approved the use of
DES for the prevention of certain complications during pregnancy. See also Com-
ment: DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963
(1978) [hereinafter "Comment"].
196. See Comment, supra note 195, at 964.
197. See Certain Estrogens for oral and parental use, 36 Fed. Reg. 21,537-38
(1971).
198. See Comment, supra note 195, at 964.
199. See Note, supra note 195, at 668.
200. See Note, supra note 195, at 669.
201. See Note, supra note 195, at 669.
202. See Note, supra note 195, at 669.
203. See Note, supra note 195, at 669-70.
25
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
were essentially interchangeable. 20 4 As a result, a number of
plaintiffs were not able to recover damages for their injuries be-
cause they could not identify the specific drug company that man-
ufactured the DES. 20 5 Other courts, however, aware of the
difficulties in applying traditional causation theories to DES
cases, allowed plaintiffs to recover notwithstanding their inability
to prove a causal connection between their injuries and a particu-
lar manufacturer. 20 6
In Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, the daughters of women who
were prescribed DES while pregnant brought a class action
suit.20 7 The plaintiffs' claim was that their cancerous or pre-
cancerous conditions resulted from in utero exposure to DES. 20 8
The plaintiffs were able to show that the drug caused their inju-
ries.20 9 Their products liability claim was that the drug manufac-
turers were negligent for failing to adequately test the drug and
warn consumers of its potential dangers. 210 The trial court dis-
missed the complaint because the plaintiffs were unable to iden-
tify the precise manufacturers of the actual pill that caused their
harm. 211
On appeal, the appellate court found that the existing excep-
tions to the traditional causation theories could not apply, which
meant the plaintiffs would not be allowed a recovery. 212 However,
the court did recognize that harm had occurred due to exposure to
DES, and devised a theory that would allow the plaintiffs a rem-
edy.213 The theory is known as market share liability.214 The
204. See Diethylstilbestrol: Extension of Class Action Procedures to Generic Drug
Litigation, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 461, 466 (1980).
205. See Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); see also Namm
v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 427 A.2d 1121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
206. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980); see also Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 289 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979);
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); Bichler v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), affd, 436 N.E.2d 182 (1982).
207. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 924.
208. See id. at 926.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 928.
213. See id. at 937. See also Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
214. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937. Market share liability modifies the alternative
liability rule that was established in Summers. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1948). In Summers, the plaintiff was injured by the bullet of one of two hunters who
had fired their guns in his direction. The plaintiff was awarded damages despite be-
ing unable to identify which of the two negligent defendants fired the shot that caused
his injury. See id. at 2. In market share liability each defendant is liable for that
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court reasoned that "as between an innocent plaintiff and negli-
gent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury."215
The Sindell court also noted:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in
science and technology create fungible goods which may harm
consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer.
The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to
prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such prod-
ucts, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs. 216
The court also stated that the imposition of liability would en-
courage defendant companies to manufacture safer products. 217
About the same time the Sindell case was decided, a New
Jersey court, in another DES products liability case, held for the
plaintiffs on a theory known as alternative liability.21s The court,
relying on Anderson v. Somberg,219 determined that the burden of
proof shifts to the defendants to show their innocence when plain-
tiffs, through no fault of their own, cannot establish which of a
group of negligent defendants caused their harm. 220 Those de-
fendants who cannot prove they are not liable remain jointly and
severally liable. 221
In Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Michigan Court of Appeals an-
nounced another theory under which plaintiffs might prevail
when they stated a cause of action without proof of the precise
causative agent.222 Like the Ferrigno court, the Michigan Court of
Appeals recognized the market share theory and stated that it
could be applied in the case.223 The court also discussed another
theory, known as the concerted action theory, under which:
portion of the judgment proportionally representative of his market share. See
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937. In alternative liability, each defendant is jointly and sever-
ally liable for the entire judgment. See id. at 928.
215. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)).
216. Id. at 936.
217. See id.
218. See Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
219. See Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929
(1975).
220. See Ferrigno, 420 A.2d 1305 at 1313.
221. See id. at 1316.
222. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 280 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). The plain-
tiffs developed cancer after their mothers took DES while pregnant, but they could
not identify the manufacturer of the DES. See id.
223. See id.
27
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those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a
tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation
or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer,
or ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit, are equally
liable with him.... Express agreement is not necessary, and all
that is required is that there be a tacit understanding .... 221
Under this theory, if it can be shown that the defendants engaged
in concerted activity, all the defendants are liable even though
only one directly caused the harm.225 The court concluded that
the plaintiffs' allegations that the manufacturers of DES acted in
concert by wrongfully producing and marketing a dangerous drug
without adequate testing or warnings, were sufficient to state a
cause of action without identifying the precise cause of their
harm.2 2
6
In Bichler v. Eli Lily & Co., the concerted action theory was
modified to allow the plaintiff to recover even though she was not
able to identify with certainty the causative agent of her harm.2 27
The Bichler court agreed with the Abel decision that "the law, es-
pecially in the products liability area, was not so rigid as to pre-
clude an injured party, with an otherwise valid claim, from a
remedy"228 solely because she could not discern the cause of her
harm.229 For this reason, the court upheld the trial court's modi-
fied definition of concerted action.23 0 This definition states that
defendants are deemed to have acted in concert even though they
"act[ed] independently of each other in committing the same
wrongful act, [ifl their acts ha [d] the effect of substantially encour-
aging or assisting the wrongful conduct of the other, which in this
case, was the alleged failure to adequately test."231 As a result,
the plaintiff was able to recover without proving causation.232
224. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS at 292 (4 th ed. 1971).
225. See Abel, 280 N.W.2d at 20.
226. See id. at 25.
227. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), affd,
436 N.E.2d 182 (1982).
228. Id. at 632.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 631.
231. Id. at 632.
232. See Bichler, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
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V. Analysis
A. Does the Current Science Involving Endocrine Disruptors
Support a Successful Products Liability Claim?
A plaintiff alleging harm due to exposure to endocrine dis-
ruptors has a number of options with regard to the theory of prod-
ucts liability under which he or she might bring the claim.233 In
all cases, whether the claim is brought under negligence, failure to
warn, or strict liability under the Restatement (Third), the plain-
tiff must prove liability, causation and damages. 234 Only liability
and causation will be discussed here.
1. Liability
A plaintiff in a suit to recover damages for exposure and harm
from endocrine disruptors would first have to show that the man-
ufacturer of the product was liable. 235 Since these chemicals are
in a wide variety of products to which a person can be exposed,
this task is not unlike that facing plaintiffs in the DES cases. 236
Like DES victims, endocrine disruptor plaintiffs cannot be certain
of who caused their exposure to the toxic substance at the root of
their injuries.23 7 Many DES plaintiffs were not able to recover
damages for their injuries because they could not identify the spe-
cific company that manufactured the DES they had taken.238
Other courts, however, aware of the difficulties in applying tradi-
tional causation theories to DES cases, allowed plaintiffs to re-
cover notwithstanding the fact that they were unable to prove a
causal connection between their injury and a particular manufac-
turer.239 Thus, the courts will need to apply a similar reasoning if
a plaintiff alleging harm due to exposure to endocrine disruptors
is to prevail.
To determine which theory should be applied to determine
who is liable, the circumstances surrounding the injury must be
233. See notes 114-87. The various theories that could be explored in filing a claim
include those typically filed in products liability actions, including negligence, failure
to warn and a breach of warranty.
234. See David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273 (1998);
see also DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 117, at 289.
235. See Owen, supra note 234, at 273.
236. See Abel, 280 N.W.2d at 22.
237. See id.
238. See Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Namm v.
Charles E. Frosst & Co., 427 A.2d 1121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
239. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 924. See also Abel, 289 N.W.2d at 20; Ferrigno, 420
A.2d at 1305; Bichler, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
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examined. Where a person alleges an injury due to exposure to an
identifiable substance emanating from a consumer product, food
or food package, he or she may be able to trace it to a number of
defendants. 240 If this can be done, an action could be brought
against all those manufacturers for allowing the toxic substance to
escape and cause harm.241
It is likely, however, that the plaintiff will not be able to de-
termine the actual manufacturer of the chemical that caused his
or her harm.242 If the market share theory were applied, proving
defendant liability would be difficult. This is because it is unlikely
the plaintiff would be able to determine the manufacturers' shares
of the market since the sale of these chemicals are usually to mul-
tiple sources and it is difficult to obtain accurate records. 243
Applying the concerted action theory of liability may be a bet-
ter option for the plaintiff who cannot identify which defendant
caused his injury.244 Using this theory the plaintiff will allege
that the defendants acted in concert by wrongfully adding chemi-
cals into a product without adequately providing for their safety or
showing the products are safe.245 If the court followed the ruling
in Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,246 they would be able to find that a man-
ufacturer could be liable despite the plaintiffs inability to show an
exact cause. Alternatively, a court could use the modified version
of the concerted action theory announced in Bichler v. Eli Lilly &
Co.247 to allow a plaintiff to recover. The plaintiff could argue
that, although the defendants acted independently, their acts of
intentionally adding the endocrine modulating substances en-
couraged or assisted the wrongful behaviors of the other defend-
ants.248 The named defendants would then be jointly and
240. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 213-22.
241. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 924.
242. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 211-22.
243. See COLBORN ET AL., suPRA note 5, at 211-22. See also Aaron M. Levin, Identi-
fication of Manufacturer of Diethylstilbestrol (DES), 370 P.L.I. LIT. 191, 209-11 (1989);
Myra P. Mulcahy, Note: Proving Causation in Toxic Torts Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1299, 1324 (1983). Mulcahy considered this for litigation concerning hazardous
waste and her theory is appropriate here.
244. See Mulcahy, supra note 243. Various other commentators have also pro-
posed this theory for toxic tort cases in which a specific cause could not be found and
for which testing has not been adequately performed. See, e.g., Allan Kanner, Envi-
ronmental and Toxic Tort Issues, SC24 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 713 (1998).
245. See Kanner, supra note 244, at 733.
246. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979).
247. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), affd,
436 N.E.2d 182 (1982).
248. See id.
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severally liable unless they could absolve themselves.249 Defend-
ants could force unnamed parties who may be culpable and not
named by the plaintiff to be joined as third party defendants. A
separate action could also be filed by the defendants against such
parties for their contribution. 250
In applying the concerted action theory, it could be argued
that it is not an equitable approach for the defendants. It should
be remembered, however, that it is the defendants who produced
the endocrine disrupting chemicals, and they were the ones who
intentionally added endocrine disrupting chemicals to products,
resulting in exposure and serious risk of harm to the plaintiff.
Since the equities weigh in favor of the plaintiff, the courts should
adopt this theory for endocrine disruptor cases.
The alternative liability approach is also an attractive alter-
native for showing liability, but the result may vary with the juris-
diction, depending upon which view is followed. 251 The court, for
example, in Ferrigno, disagreed with Sindell.252 In Ferrigno, a re-
covery under alternative liability was allowed even though the
court could not determine that the defendants actually caused the
harm.253 Thus, if the courts were to follow the decision in Fer-
rigno the plaintiff first needs to establish that the defendants
breached their duty of care by adding the endocrine disruptor to
the product, that harm resulted from exposure to the substance,
and that the defendant produced the chemical. 254 Once the plain-
tiff has established these elements, the burden of proving causa-
tion then shifts to the defendants. 255 Those defendants who
cannot meet this burden will be held jointly and severally lia-
ble.256 Thus, a plaintiff harmed by endocrine disruptors bringing
a products liability suit under an alternative liability theory
would have a chance for a remedy even where it is not possible to
name all potential defendants.
While it may be observed that shifting the burden of proving
causation to defendants appears to be unfair, it should be
remembered that the defendants intentionally added the chemical
249. See id. See also Mulcahy, supra note 243, at 1324.
250. See Mulcahy, supra note 243, at 1324.
251. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 931; see also Ferrigno, 420 A.2d at 1305; Mulcahy,
supra note 243, at 1324.
252. See Ferrigno, 420 A.2d at 1305.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
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to the product and the chemical caused the harm. While it may be
true that adopting an alternative liability theory for endocrine dis-
ruptor torts may cause traditional concepts and basic principles of
tort law to be distorted or abandoned, 25 7 the endocrine disruptor
tort is not a "traditional" injury. Rather, as observed by the
Sindell court, it is "the result of our industrialized society."258
Therefore, as one commentator has noted, "it is important that our
traditional legal judgments evolve to keep up with our progressing
society."259
2. Causation
In determining whether a plaintiff would be able to establish
that they were harmed from exposure to products containing en-
docrine disruptor chemicals, it is first necessary to look at toxic
tort litigation for guidance. 260 Toxic tort litigation has forced the
courts to articulate the basis for causation in chemical-related in-
juries. 261 The courts have looked at how scientific methods and
scientific theories that may not conform to the scientific norm
should be evaluated in terms of applicability and adequacy. 262 To
survive a motion for summary judgment the plaintiff must dimin-
ish the uncertainty in the scientific methods or theories that sur-
round proof of causation.263 The courts have addressed this issue
in a number of ways. 26 4
In order to recover damages in a suit alleging harm due to
exposure to endocrine disruptors, a plaintiff must prove that a
chemical or chemicals are the cause of his or her disease or
harm. 265 Specifically, the plaintiff must prove: 1) the toxic sub-
stance has the ability to cause the alleged harm; 2) the plaintiffs
exposure to the toxic substance was of sufficient quantity to cause
the disease; and 3) the injury or harm was caused by exposure to
the toxic substance. 266 Thus, a plaintiff hoping to recover in a
257. See Namm, 427 A.2d at 1127.
258. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
259. Mulcahy, supra note 243, at 1324.
260. See Shawn A. Copeland et al., Current Issues in Toxic Tort Litigation, SC 64
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 33, 76-86 (1998).
261. See id. at 77.
262. See id. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993).
263. See Copeland et al., supra note 260, at 77.
264. See Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to
the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH L.J. 189, 198 (1992).
265. See id.
266. See id.
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products liability suit for harm suffered from exposure to endo-
crine disruptors would first have to identify a specific chemical or
chemicals in the product to which he or she was exposed. 267 In
this respect, individuals alleging harm due to endocrine dis-
ruptors face problems in proving this part of causation similar to
those encountered by DES plaintiffs.268 Since any potential injury
due to endocrine disruptors would be caused by fungible goods,
they confront the problem of identifying the cause of their inju-
ries. 269 Since endocrine disruptors may be found in a number of
consumer products 270 and their packaging, 271 the plaintiff does
not have an easy burden to overcome. However, analytical meth-
ods do exist to measure these chemicals,27 2 so it is not something
that is impossible to accomplish. Of course, the plaintiff would
need to determine the amount present, which can be accomplished
using analytical methods.27 3 Thus, it would be possible for a
plaintiff to show he or she was exposed to a specific endocrine dis-
ruptor or multiple endocrine disruptors.
The plaintiff must also prove that exposure to the endocrine
disruptor was in an amount sufficient to cause a disease. 274 It is
in this element of causation that the plaintiff faces his or her most
formidable obstacle. Traditionally, in the absence of a specific
cause-effect relationship following exposure to a chemical, courts
have relied on epidemiological studies to support a direct cause of
injury. 275 Epidemiological risk analysis has been required as a
minimal requirement by some courts to infer causation, especially
when the cause of the disease or injury cannot be definitively
proven through a plaintiffs medical record.27 6 The courts have
267. See id.
268. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
269. See id.
270. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 122-41.
271. See generally supra note 14.
272. See generally supra note 14.
273. See Poulter, supra note 264, at 231.
274. See Poulter, supra note 264, at 198.
275. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw.
U. L. REV. 643, 646-53 (1993). Epidemiological studies compare two groups of popula-
tions - one exposed to a particular chemical and one not exposed - and attempt to
determine whether that exposure has resulted in an increased incidence of disease or
injury in that particular population. See id. A chemical is said to cause a disease or
injury if it increases the relative frequency of that disease or injury when it is present
and decreases that frequency when it is absent. See id.
276. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig., 11 F. Supp. 1223, 1231,
1261-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
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not been consistent in determining what constitutes an acceptable
epidemiological study in terms of statistical significance and rela-
tive risk.277 Epidemiological studies are able to uncover weaker
toxic effects, 278 but some toxic effects are too small to be detected
in an epidemiological study, even though the effect was caused by
the substance. 279 These findings cannot satisfy the burden of
proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard.280
In a toxic tort case, plaintiffs generally do not use epidemio-
logical studies alone. 2 1 When epidemiological studies are availa-
ble, a plaintiff will normally supplement these studies with
medical testimony.28 2 Even when epidemiological studies are not
available, the medical testimony offered for a plaintiff will at-
tempt to establish: 1) that the exposure to the chemical was the
cause of the plaintiffs disease; 2) why the diagnostic tests used to
establish the cause of the condition were appropriate; and 3) why
other factors the plaintiff has are not relevant to the existence of
the disease.28 3 The courts have not been consistent with regard to
the use of medical testimony with or without the presence of epi-
demiological studies. 2 4 At least one court has determined that
medical testimony need not be dependent on an epidemiological
study which first establishes a cause-effect relationship between
the chemical and the disease.28 5 Other courts have stated that
medical testimony should be considered additional supporting evi-
dence to an epidemiological study.28 6
277. See Green, supra note 275, at 653.
278. See Green, supra note 275, at 653.
279. See Green, supra note 275, at 653.
280. See Green, supra note 275, at 653. See also Harold Ginsburg, Use and Mis-
uses of Epidemiological Data in the Courtroom: Defining the Limits of Inferential and
Particularistic Evidence in Mass Tort Litigation, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 423, 431 (1986);
Diana L. Mitts, Epidemiological Evidence as a Basis for Causation: Implications for
Suspected Pesticide-Induced Cancer, 8 SANJALR 187, 188 (1998).
281. See Poulter, supra note 264, at 231.
282. See Poulter, supra note 264, at 232.
283. See Green, supra note 275, at 653.
284. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(jury verdict upheld for plaintiff where plaintiffs case was based on expert testi-
mony). But see In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp.
1014, 1027, 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 52 F.3d (2d Cir. 1994) (dis-
trict court set aside jury verdict on grounds that epidemiological evidence combined
with clinical evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to meet preponderance of
evidence standard).
285. See In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. at
1027, 1030.
286. See Poulter, supra note 264, at 231.
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Epidemiological studies have recurrent biases and flaws, and
because of their design of requiring a statistical evaluation by ag-
gregation, they can obscure effects on individuals. 2 7 Thus, when
courts insist on epidemiological studies and reject other types of
evidence on causation, such as animal studies or in vitro research,
individuals who may have been harmed by a chemical are denied
recovery in tort. In those cases, courts have told plaintiffs, in ef-
fect, there may be good evidence of a toxic effect due to chemical
exposure, but because the effect is only seen in animals or in vitro,
or have little to no probabilistic or statistical significance, it does
not meet the causation element and no recovery is possible. 288
Until 1993, the courts were divided as to the standard re-
quired for admitting expert scientific evidence. 28 9 In 1993, the Su-
preme Court, in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceutical Co.,
articulated a new standard to govern the admissibility of scientific
evidence. 290 Rejecting the rigid "general acceptance" requirement
established by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Frye v. U.S.,291 the Supreme Court relied
on Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (FRE 702).292 Under Daubert, a
trial judge, in considering the admissibility of scientific evidence,
must first decide whether: 1) the evidence constitutes scientific
knowledge; and 2) the evidence will have a valid connection to the
issues in the case (will assist the trier of fact). 293
287. See Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Claims and Statistical Links: The Role of Sci-
entific Uncertainty in Hazardous Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 498
n. 155 (1988). See also Heidi L. Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure
Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995).
288. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6 h Cir. 1992)
(court rejects animal studies because they raise only a possibility rather than a
probability of harm in humans); Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st
Cir. 1987) (requiring confirmatory epidemiological evidence in addition to animal-
studies evidence); Hupp v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 25, 30 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (only
epidemiological studies could prove that a swine flu caused multiple sclerosis). But
see Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding a
"cause effect relationship need not be clearly established by animal or epidemiological
studies"); Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262,266 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (the
plaintiffs burden was not "to produce an unassailable scientific study on causation),
affd and modified in part, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986).
289. See United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying the
"general acceptance standard"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).
290. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
291. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
292. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
293. See id. at 590-91.
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To be considered scientific knowledge, the Court said that the
testimony must be derived from a scientific method. 294 In analyz-
ing whether a scientific method or technique is reliable the Court
offered four non-exclusive, general observations that are designed
to assist the trial judge.295 The general observations noted by the
Court include: 1) whether a theory or technique "can (and has
been) tested; '296 2) whether it had been subjected to peer review
and publication (although the publication or lack of publication in
a peer review journal is not dispositive in considering the scien-
tific validity);297 3) its potential rate of error;298 and 4) whether
the theory or technique is "generally accepted."299 In outlining
these criteria, the Court stressed that the methodology used was
what should be considered in the evaluation of the reliability of
the scientific knowledge, not the conclusion that the method gen-
erated. 300 Further, the subject of scientific testimony does not
have to be "known to a certainty."30 1 The only requirement is that
the process used to derive the inference must be based on a scien-
tific method. 30 2
The Court used FRE 702 to state that to help determine the
relevance of the testimony it must "assist the trier of fact to under-
stand or to determine a fact or issue."30 3 Thus, to determine the
relevancy of the testimony the judge must ask whether the meth-
odology or reasoning used by the scientific evidence is useful for
resolving the issue in dispute.30 4 This is a more flexible approach
than the "general acceptance" test under Frye.30 5 An epidemiolog-
ical study under Daubert "is only probative if the correlation be-
tween the exposure and the disease supports an inference that
exposure was more likely than not the cause of injury."30 6 In addi-
tion, the Court recognized that evidence could be excluded by the
294. See id. at 595.
295. See id. at 592-94.
296. Id. at 592.
297. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
298. See id. at 594.
299. Id.
300. See id. at 595.
301. Id. at 590.
302. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
303. Id. at 589.
304. See id.
305. Id. at 594. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically stated that "the inquiry
envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one." Id.
306. Jeffrey D. Cutler, Comment: Implications of Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evi-
dence: Does Daubert Deal a Death Blow to Toxic Tort Plaintiffs?, 10 ENVTL. L. & Li-
TIG., 189, 200 (1995).
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trial judge.30 7 Using summary judgment and judgment as a mat-
ter of law were "appropriate safeguards" when the plaintiff did not
have sufficient evidence to present to a jury.30 8
Thus, in considering whether or not an epidemiological study
is admissible, Daubert states that a plaintiff must only demon-
strate scientific validity, as well as statistical significance. 30 9
More importantly, however, Daubert does not preclude the admis-
sibility of other evidence that may be relevant to the plaintiffs
case, such as an expert medical opinion and toxicological stud-
ies.310 This observation is an important consideration if a plaintiff
is to prevail in a suit alleging harm from exposure to an endocrine
disruptor. To date, there are no definitive human epidemiological
studies to support a causal relationship between exposure to an
endocrine disruptor and a disease, such as cancer, an immune de-
ficiency, or other harm.311 However, there is increasing toxicologi-
cal evidence in animal models that a link exists between exposure
to these chemicals and a toxic response. 312 Thus, the Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert supports the call by various commen-
tators urging the courts to adopt a preponderance of the available
evidence standard to enable plaintiffs to prove causation in cases
alleging toxic exposure. 313 By adopting a preponderance of the ev-
idence standard, a plaintiff alleging harm due to exposure to endo-
crine disruptors would then be able to introduce animal
toxicological studies and expert medical opinion in lieu of having
substantial, reliable and consistent epidemiological studies. 31 4 Of
course, the toxicological studies and medical opinions would have
307. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. In so stating, the Supreme Court addressed the
concern voiced by the lower courts that a lesser standard would open the floodgates in
toxic substance litigation. The Court thus recognized that products liability is
grounded in the premise that an individual should be compensated for damages to
himself or his property. See id. at 597. Evidence may be excluded by a court if it does
not have probative value or the expert testimony did not rely on facts and data that
are reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field. See id. See also Carl F.
Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary Drawing and the Need for Context-Sensitive Science
in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
1, 4 (1996) (suggesting that those judges who follow Daubert are excluding too much
evidence).
308. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
309. See id. at 594.
310. See id. at 597. The Court stated "the scientific project is advanced by broad
and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incor-
rect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance." Id. at 597.
311. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 122-41.
312. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 122-41.
313. See Green, supra note 275, at 680. See also Mitts, supra note 280, at 208.
314. See Mitts, supra note 280, at 208.
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to meet the standards for reliability and relevance set forth in
Daubert.315 If they did not meet these standards then the court
would be free to use the judicial controls available to them. 316 As
more than one commentator has noted, "imposing a heightened
evidentiary threshold when the required scientific evidence may
never be forthcoming, is contrary to judicial notions of fairness
and social responsibility."317 Furthermore, "[w]here epidemiologi-
cal studies are lacking or inconclusive it is unjustifiable to exclude
other toxicological evidence." 3 18 Thus, by adopting a preponder-
ance of the available evidence standard the question would prop-
erly be placed before a jury. The jury would then decide whether,
based upon the evidence before it, the chemical was a substantial
factor in causing the harm claimed. 319 In other words, it is up to
the jury to decide "whether that cause had such an effect in pro-
ducing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as the
cause."
320
A plaintiff alleging harm due to exposure to endocrine dis-
ruptors may still have a formidable task in proving causation.
The EPA is currently working to develop a screening program to
identify potential endocrine disruptors. 321 Many manufacturers
do not test chemicals for toxic potential unless required by regula-
tion.322 If studies are conducted, they examine one substance
rather than combinations, 323 and do not investigate low dose and
slow exposure. 324 Additionally, the current regulatory environ-
ment does not support the development of data other than those
315. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-91. But see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc.,
43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). It should be noted that on remand the Texas Appellate
Court, using the Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert, refined the test announced by
the Supreme Court to enable them to maintain a restrictive approach in allowing
novel scientific evidence. Thus, the approach advocated here would not be applicable
for the Ninth Circuit.
316. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
317. Mitts, supra note 280, at 208. See also Green, supra note 275, at 681.
318. Green, supra note 275, at 681.
319. See Green, supra note 275, at 681. As noted by one commentator, the sub-
stantial factor test "acknowledges the fact that in the usual course, '[an] event with-
out millions of causes is simply inconceivable; and the mere fact of causation, as
distinguished from the nature and degree of the causal connection, can provide no
clue of any kind to singling out those which are to be held legally responsible'." Id.
320. Green, supra note 275, at 681.
321. See EDSTAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at ES 1-15.
322. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Prod-
ucts, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 784-90 (1997).
323. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 220.
324. See Maurice Zeeman, Our Fate is Connected with the Animals, 46 BIOSCIENCE
542, 544 (1996).
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examining the risk of cancer.325 However, the body of evidence
implicating these substances in causing harm is growing. 326 For
example, products containing PVCs are made with chemicals
called phthalates. 327 Most recently, phthalates have been found
in blood stored in intravenous (IV) bags made from PVCs.328
Animal studies suggest that phthalates can damage the heart,
kidney, liver, and testicles, and may cause cancer. 329 While PVC
manufacturers maintain that their products are safe,330 at least
one PVC maker, Abbott Laboratories, has admitted there are "too
little data to draw hard conclusions. '331 Abbott Laboratories has
included a warning to that effect with some of its IV bags. 332
VI. Conclusions
Our Stolen Future has raised concerns about the exposure of
individuals to chemicals that are capable of disrupting the endo-
crine system and causing harm. 333
This paper has examined the issue of whether potential plain-
tiffs could successfully pursue a products liability claim. Courts
have been willing to dispense with traditional causation tests to
allow victims of DES-related injuries to recover without having to
prove who manufactured the product that caused their injury.33 4
The approaches may have differed with respect to what the plain-
tiffs must prove for recovery, but in all of these cases the burden of
proving causation shifted to the defendants. 335 For a successful
325. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 221. As noted by these authors the FDA,
through the Delaney Clause, bans food additives that cause cancer in any other
animal species. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(A) (1998). Other adverse effects, such as im-
munotoxic or effects on reproduction, are regulated on a risk-benefit approach or not
at all.
326. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 122-41.
327. See Jeffrey Kluger, Poisonous Plastics?, TIME, Mar. 1, 1999, at 28.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See id. As noted in this article, PVC manufacturers and other manufacturers
of chemicals added to food, drugs and cosmetics, as well as to products that contact
food, drugs and cosmetics (such as plastics and can coatings) argue that animal toxic-
ity studies show toxic effects at levels much higher than a human would ever absorb.
However, these tests do not take into account the potential synergistic effects of these
chemicals. Also, in at least one experiment, rats were given low levels of PVC doses
and still exhibited adverse effects.
331. Id.
332. See id.
333. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 122-41. See also EDSTAC FINAL REPORT,
supra note 18, at ES-1-15.
334. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
335. See id.; Anderson, 338 A.2d at 1; Abel, 280 N.W.2d at 22.
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products liability claim for exposure to an endocrine disruptor, the
plaintiffs would be required to prove that they have sustained an
injury, and that the injury was caused by exposure to a chemical
causing endocrine disruption.336 It would also be necessary to
show that the defendants produced or intentionally added these
substances to the product.337 The burden of proof would then shift
to the defendants. 338 The defendants could either disprove the
claims or establish that the particular substance could not have
caused the injuries. 339
Plaintiffs hoping to prevail in a lawsuit alleging products lia-
bility face numerous hurdles in bringing a successful suit. The
most formidable challenge is to prove the injury was due to expo-
sure to the endocrine disrupting chemical. Currently, EPA and
the FDA are establishing a screening program for elucidating
whether a chemical is an endocrine disruptor.3 40 Until this test-
ing is validated and performed, the issue surrounding potential
products liability actions with regard to endocrine disruptors
leaves plaintiffs to rely on existing animal toxicological data and
limited epidemiological studies.341 Until Daubert, the courts were
reluctant to use animal toxicity data in the absence of more defini-
tive epidemiology studies.342 However, Daubert343 and the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts344 offer potential mechanisms by which
plaintiffs may be able to prevail by a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. Those studies will come down to a battle of the
experts and a sympathetic jury. The issue surrounding potential
products liability action with regard to endocrine disruptors is
also confounded by a skepticism about toxic risks: "Innocent until
proven guilty may sound fine in theory, but it lets the bodies pile
up before the truth gets written."345 Many manufacturers do not
test chemicals for toxic potential unless required by regulation. 346
Even if studies are conducted, manufacturers often examine one
substance rather than combinations, 347 or do not investigate low
336. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937; Anderson, 338 A.2d at 1; Abel, 280 N.W.2d at 22.
337. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937; Anderson, 338 A.2d at 1; Abel, 280 N.W.2d at 22.
338. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937; Anderson, 338 A.2d at 1; Abel, 280 N.W.2d at 22.
339. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937; Anderson, 338 A.2d at 1; Abel, 280 N.W.2d at 22.
340. See EDSTAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at ES-I-15.
341. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 110-21.
342. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
343. See id.
344. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998).
345. Mark Hertsgaard, Benefit of the Doubts, 10 NATION (July 8, 1996).
346. See Wagner, supra note 322, at 784-90.
347. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 5, at 220.
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dose and exposure over time.348 Thus, the plaintiff may need to
bear the burden of having tests and studies conducted. Subse-
quent plaintiffs, however, will have the data available to them. As
more is learned about the characteristics of endocrine disruptors,
plaintiffs' expenditures to collect data for proof will decrease.
At the same time, the proposal is not unfair to the defendants
who, by producing and inadequately testing a fungible item, have
created a situation where innocent plaintiffs are harmed and are
unable to trace the injury-causing substance back to its source. 349
The defendants are given the chance to show they did not cause
the harm.350 Lessening the plaintiffs burden of proof is justified.
This paper has examined the current issue of endocrine dis-
rupting chemicals and has explored various legal theories that
might be pursued in order for a plaintiff to sustain a successful
suit in products liability. The Supreme Court's holding in
Daubert,351 as well as the Restatement (Third) of Torts,35 2 have
afforded plaintiffs the possibility that such an action will be sus-
tained. The courts must now recognize the theories of causation
that, traditionally, they were reluctant to recognize.
348. See Zeeman, supra note 324, at 544.
349. See Kanner, supra note 244, at 733.
350. See Kanner, supra note 244, at 733.
351. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
352. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998).
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